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586 PEOPLE 11. GASTELO [67 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 11197. In Bank. Oct. 30,1967.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MAX MUNOZ 
GASTELO, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Search Warrants-Execution-Una.i1-
nounced Forcible Entry.-Forcible entry into a house to exe-
cute a search warrant, in the absence of the refusal of admit-
tance by the occupant following notice of the peace officer's 
authority and purpose spooified in Pen. Code, § 1531, cannot be 
justified on the blanket basis of the crime or evidence 
involved, such as narcotics cases or other cases involving easily 
disposable evidence; for such entry, as in any kind of police 
action tending to disturb the security of people in their homes, 
U.S. C.Jnst., 4th Amend., requires that a particular reason must 
be shown, based on specific facts (disapproving, to the extent 
inconsistent herewith, People v. Manriquez, 231 Cal.App.2d 725 __ _ 
[42 Cal.Rptr. 157], and People v. Samuels, 229 Cal.App.2d 351 
[40 Cal.Rptr. 290]). 
[2] Poisons - Narcotics - Admissibility of Evidence - Unlawful 
Search.-In a prosecution for possession )f heroin (Health & 
Safe Code, § 11500), it was reversible error to admit into evi-
dence a small packet of heroin found by the police between 
the mattress and box springs of defendant's bed, where such 
evidence was crucial to the prosecution's case and where, 
although the police had a search warrant, the only proffered 
justification for their unannounced forcible entry into the 
apartment, in violation of Pen. Code, § 1531, was the asserted 
general propensity of narcotics violators to destroy evidence 
when confronted by police officers. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joseph A. Wapner, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for possession of heroin. Judgment of convic-
tion reversed. 
Frederic G. Marks, under appointment by th~ Supreme 
Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, S. Clark Moore and Richard Tan-
zer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Rev., Searches and Seizures, § 17; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures (1st ed § 41). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] SearcheR and Seizures, § 17; [2] 
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction of possession of heroin in violation of section 11500 
of the Health and Safety Code. 
The facts are not in dispute. Los Angeles police officers 
obtained a warrant for the search of the apartment of Donna 
Trujillo, with whom defendant was living, on the basis of a 
reliable informant's report that he had purchased narcotics 
from defendant at Donna's apartment more than 30 times 
during the previous 45 days. His last purchase was on Decem-
ber 23, 1964. About 8 :20 in the morning of Saturday, Decem-
ber 26, 1964, four officers went to Donna's apartment to exe-
cute the warrant. Outside they saw an automobile that they 
believed was defendant's. Two officers went to the rear door of 
the apartment and two to the front. Without knocking, 
announcing their purpose or demanding admittance, they 
forced entry through both doors. Defendant and Donna Tru-
jillo were asleep in the bedroom, and the officers pulled 
defendant from the bed. They served the warrant, searched 
the apartment, and found a small packet of heroin between 
the mattress and box springs of the bed. Defendant was 
arrested. Two days later, he confessed to possession of the 
heroin. 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudi-
cial error in admitting the heroin into evidence over his objec-
tion that it was illegally obtained in violation of Penal Code, 
section 1531. 
Section 1531 provides that to execute a search warrant 
« «The officer may break open any outer or inner door or win-
dow of a house~ ... if, after notice of his authority and 
purpose, he is refused admittance. " 
The Attorney General contends that compliance with sec-
tion 1531 was excused under the rule of People v. Maddox 
(1956) 46 Ca1.2d 301 [294 P.2d 6]. 
In Maddox, we held that compliance with the Bubsfimtially 
identical notice requirements of Penal Code section 844 for 
making arrests1 was excused, if the facts known to the officer 
before his entry were sufficient to support his good faith belief 
that compliance would have increased his peril or frustrated 
the arrest. Later cases have included the prevention of destruc-
tion of evidence as an additional ground for noncompliance 
l' 'To make an arrest, .•. a peace· officer, may break open the door ... 
of the house in which the person to be arrested is ... after having de· 
manded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is 
desired.' , 
) 
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with section 844. (Peoplc v. Covan (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 416 
[2 Cal.Rptr. 811] ; Peoplc v. Morris (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 81 
[320 P.2d 67].) Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23 [10 
L.Ed.2d 726, 83 S.Ct. 1623], approved the principle of these 
cases under Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. 
The same principle supports similar exceptions to the require-
ments of section 1531. 
[1] The Attorney General contends that unannounced 
forcible entry to execute a search warrant is always reason-
able in narcotics cases, on the ground that narcotics violators 
normally are on the alert to destroy the easily disposable evi-
dence quickly at the first sign of an officer's presence. 
We do not agree with this contention. Neither this court nor 
the United States Supreme Court has held that unannounced 
forcible entries may be authorized by a blanket rule based on 
the type of crime or evidence involved. Indeed in the Ker case 
the court' was divided 4 to 4 on the question whether the 
evidence offered to excuse compliance with the notice and 
demand requirements was sufficient.2 
In Maddox, the officers knocked, heard a male voice call 
"wait a minute" followed by the sound of retreating foot-
steps, and only then forced entry. Similarly, in People v. Car-
rillo (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 387 [50 Ca1.Rptr. 185, 412 P.2d 377], 
entry followed a knock and observation of suspicious move-
ments. In People v. Smith (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779 [48 Cal.Rptr. 
382, 409 P.2d 222], and People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 
690 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365], the officers were in fresh 
pursuit of gun-wielding defendants. Similarly, in People v. 
Hammond (1960) 54 Ca1.2d 846 [9 Ca1.Rptr. 233, 357 P.2d 
289], officers had cause to believe defendant had a. gun and 
was under the influence of heroin at the time of arrest. 
Thus we have excused compliance with the statute in 
accordance with established common law exceptions to the 
notice and demand requirements on the basis of the specific 
facts involved. No such basis exists for nullifying the statute 
in all narcotics cases, and, by logical extension, in all other 
cases involving easily disposable evidence. The statute does 
not contain the seeds of such far-reaching self-destruction. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, a specific showing must 
always be made to justify any kind of police action tending to 
disturb the security of the people in their homes. Unan-
2Justice Harlan was of the opinion that Fourth Amendment standards 
should not be applied to the states. Thus, the judgment of conviction 
was affirmed, 5·4. 
nounced forcible entry is in itself a serious disturbance of 
that security and cannot be justified on a blanket basis. 
Otherwise the constitutional test of reasonableness would turn 
only on practical expediency, and the amendment's primary 
safeguard-the requirement of particularity-would be lost. 
Just as the police must have sufficiently particular reason to 
enter at all, so must they have some particular reason to enter 
in the manner chosen. To the extent that People v. Mam'iquez 
(1965) 231 CalApp.2d 725 [42 CalRptr. 157], and People v. 
Samuels (1964) 229 CalApp.2d 351 [40 CalRptr. 290], are 
contrary to our conclusion herein, they are disapproved. 
[2] Since there was nothing in the present case to justify 
the officers' failure to comply with section 1531: except an 
asserted general propensity of narcotics violators to destroy 
evidence when confronted by police officers, the officers' entry 
was unlawful The illegally obtained evidence, which was cru-
cial to the prosecution '8 case, should therefore have been 
excluded. 
The judgment is reversed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
